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Abstract 
This chapter discusses the research agenda on optimal bank productive efficiency and industrial structure.  
One goal of this agenda is to answer some fundamental questions in financial industry restructuring, such 
as what motivates bank managers to engage in mergers and acquisitions, and to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of consolidation, which is essentially an empirical question.  The chapter reviews the recent 
literature, including techniques for modeling bank production and the empirical results on scale 
economies, scope economies, and efficiency in banking.   
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
The banking industry has been undergoing a significant restructuring over the last several years.  
Since the mid-1980s the number of commercial banks has fallen by over 6,000 (from 14,407 in 1985 to 
7630 in 2004) as a result of failures and especially mergers.  According to FDIC statistics, there were over 
9,400 mergers, an average of 523 per year, between 1985 and 2002.
2  The average asset size of banks has 
also increased, as assets are being redistributed from smaller banks to larger ones.  In real terms, the 
average asset size of U.S. banks has more than tripled since 1985 and in 2004 was over $1 billion.  
Citigroup, Inc., the largest bank holding company in the U.S. (as of May 2005) has nearly $1.5 trillion in 
assets.  Another result of consolidation is that by some measures, banking is becoming more concentrated.  
According to data from commercial bank reports of condition and income, the largest 10 banks in the U.S. 
were holding almost half of the U.S. banking industry’s assets in 2004, compared to 25 percent in 1985.   
Banks with assets over $5 billion were holding about 79 percent of total U.S. banking industry assets in 
                                                      
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve 




2004, compared with 47 percent in 1985 and banks with more than $10 billion in assets were holding 
almost 75 percent of industry assets in 2004, compared with about 35 percent in 1985.   
Consolidation is a global phenomenon: there has been a considerable amount of merger activity 
not only in the U.S. but in other countries.  The Group of Ten study (2001) of consolidation in 13 
countries in the 1990s indicates that of 7,304 financial mergers, 61 percent involved banks, and the 
number of banks fell in almost every country.
3   
The consolidation in the financial services industry has raised some conundrums.   
Conundrum 1: The consolidation in the banking industry has created some very large banks; 
indeed, as of December 31, 2004, there were three bank holding companies in the U.S. with over 
$1 trillion in assets.  Bank managers say that one of their motivations in consolidating is to capture scale 
economies – i.e., efficiencies gained from operating at a large scale – but much of the literature suggests 
these economies are exhausted at relatively small sizes. 
Conundrum 2: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagall prohibitions against 
mixing commercial banking with investment banking and allowed commercial banks into other nonbank 
activities (like insurance).  Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, an institution must form a Bank Holding 
Company (BHC) and then convert the BHC into a Financial Holding Company (FHC) before engaging in 
nontraditional activities.  As of July 2, 2004, there were 637 FHCs; most were created from long standing 
BHCs rather than de novo.  Many are small; most are not engaged in nonbanking activities.  Indeed, 
fewer commercial banks have moved into those areas than was anticipated when the Act was passed. 
Conundrum 3:  Official government statistics suggest that productivity in the banking industry 
rose at a slower rate from 1994 to 2002 than that in the rest of the corporate sector.  This seems somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2 FDIC’s Historical Statistics on Banking, Table CB02, Changes in Number of Institutions, FDIC-Insured 
Commercial Banks, January 14, 2005. 
3Only in Belgium, Japan, and Australia did the number of banks rise in the 1990s – Japan because of a change in 
definition and Belgium by just two banks.  Although the number of banks in Australia increased from 34 in 1990 to 
44 in 1999, the report characterizes the banking industry in Australia as highly concentrated.  The five largest banks 
in Australia hold 74 percent of deposits, while the five largest banks in the U.S. in 1999 held 27 percent of deposits.  
(As of 2004, the largest five banks in the U.S. held 38 percent of industry deposits and 37 percent of industry assets.)  
 
3 
surprising given the technological advances that have been made in banking over the last two decades.
4
One goal of the research agenda on optimal bank productive efficiency and industrial structure is 
to answer some fundamental questions in financial industry restructuring, such as what motivates bank 
managers to engage in mergers and acquisitions, and to evaluate the costs and benefits of consolidation, 
which is essentially an empirical question.  The most recent literature has begun to shed some light on 
these three puzzles via several advances in modeling bank production which are then brought to data.  
These advances include recognizing that the level of risk is an endogenous choice of bank managers and 
that financial capital is an input into bank production.  Models that allow for managerial preferences that 
differ from cost minimization and profit maximization and that allow managers to trade off risk versus 
return have been developed and estimated.  The models can be used to help in understanding the 
motivation and outcomes of banking industry consolidation. 
Consolidation is a potential positive for the industry and economy to the extent that it eliminates 
inefficient banks and results in a healthier banking system via better diversification of risks.  Positives 
potentially include the following: (1) More efficient scale or product mix.  Scale or scope economies exist 
if the average cost of production declines as size or number of products increases.  Average cost might 
decline as the size of the bank increases if there are significant fixed costs that can be spread over larger 
sized operations.  Technological change has afforded banks new tools of financial engineering (e.g., 
derivatives, off-balance-sheet guarantees, and risk management) that may be more efficiently produced by 
larger institutions.  Also, new delivery methods for banking services (e.g., on-line banking, phone centers, 
ATMs) favor larger banks that can spread the fixed costs of setting up such systems over larger volumes, 
implying lower average costs of production.  With respect to product mix, if there are cost 
complementarities among products (e.g., joint use of inputs, such as marketing), then producing multiple 
                                                      
4According to Berger and Mester (2003), government agencies typically measure productivity by the ratio of an 
output index to an input index.  Updating the statistics reported in Berger and Mester (2003), average annual growth 
in labor productivity (measured by output per employee hour) in commercial banking (NAICS Code 52211) was 
1.58 percent over 1994-2002, compared to 4.09 percent in manufacturing, 2.34 percent in nonfarm businesses, and 
2.79 percent in nonfinancial corporations.  These data indicate banking productivity is rising at a slower pace than 
the productivity of the rest of the corporate sector.  
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products in the same bank can be efficient.  (2) Better diversification over product lines and/or across 
geographic markets.  The price of risk-taking falls via diversification, and there is some evidence that 
U.S. acquiring banks bid more for targets when the M&A would lead to significant diversification gains 
(Benston, Hunter, Wall, 1995).  (3)  Higher X-efficiency.  Even firms that are operating at the efficient 
scale of operations and producing the efficient mix of products might not be doing so in a manner that 
minimizes costs, e.g., managers may be wasting some of the firm’s inputs or diverting some for their own 
benefit.  Consolidation can help rid the industry of such X-inefficiency to the extent that more efficient 
firms take over less efficient firms and are able to extend efficient operations to the target.  In many U.S. 
M&As, a larger, more efficient institution takes over a smaller, less efficient institution and acquiring 
banks are more cost efficient than target banks on average (Pilloff and Santomero, 1998). 
But consolidation could also be a negative for the industry and economy.  It could result in a less 
competitive banking system, concentrating market power in a handful of very large institutions, or reduce 
the supply of funds to small firms by driving community banks out of business.  To the extent that banks 
can be “too-big-to-fail,” consolidation might be motivated by banks’ desire to exploit the under-priced 
federal safety net.  Using 1990 data on U.S. bank holding companies, Hughes and Mester (1993) found 
evidence of such a “too-big-to-fail” size advantage: for banks with greater than $6.5 billion in assets, an 
increase in size, holding default risk and asset quality constant, significantly lowers the uninsured deposit 
price. Consolidation might be motivated by a desire to maximize managers’ objectives and therefore not 
be socially optimal.  But even if consolidation is motivated by a desire to maximize shareholder value, it 
need not be socially optimal.  While shareholder value can be raised via more efficient production, it can 
also be raised via higher prices if banks’ market power rises via consolidation  
Systemic risk problems might also increase as a result of consolidation.  Adverse shocks to a 
large bank can be transmitted across the financial system, since a large bank has more linkages to other 
banks. As discussed in the G10 report (2001) on consolidation, evidence shows that interdependencies 
between large and complex banking organizations have increased in the last 10 years in the U.S. and 
Japan and are beginning to do so in Europe.  These increases are correlated with consolidation (but a  
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causal link has not been established).  According to the G10 report, the interdependencies most associated 
with consolidation include interbank loans, market activities such as over-the-counter derivatives, and 
payment and settlement systems.   
Research suggests that consolidation in the latter half of the 1990s was not driven by the cleanup 
of failed or failing banks, since bank performance was very good (Berger and Mester, 2003); thus, it is a 
trend rather than merely a response to cyclical events.
5  Instead, changes in the banking environment 
appear to be important factors spurring consolidation.  These include technological progress, 
improvements in financial condition, which allowed for more voluntary M&As, deregulation of 
geographic and product restrictions on banking, which allowed the industry to evolve into the structure 
that would have existed had the restrictions not been imposed, and excess capacity in the industry or 
particular markets.  International consolidation (globalization) of markets also has been a factor.  Transfer 
of securities, goods, and services in international markets creates demand for financial services in 
international markets, spurring cross-border M&As.  Banks can also achieve the dual goals of risk 
diversification and new sources of funds by cross-border expansion.  But these potential benefits must be 
weighed against the costs, which include having to deal with different regulatory regimes and corporate 
and national cultural differences.      
The research on optimal bank productive efficiency and industrial structure can help in evaluating 
the extent to which consolidation yields cost and revenue benefits or, instead whether it is a way that 
agency problems within the firm are manifested, whether consolidation is attractive to managers because 
they gain from “building empires” and controlling larger banks, and whether large banks allow managers 
to consume “agency goods” such as reduced effort and risk avoidance.  In helping us understand the 
motivation for consolidation, the research can also help guide policy regarding consolidation in the 
                                                      
5 The mid-1980s to early 1990s was a time of relatively poor performance of U.S. banks. Performance problems 
with loans to less developed countries and in commercial real estate markets led to performance problems at U.S. 
banks and a “credit crunch” in the early 1990s.  This was the first phase of the consolidation trend and the number of 
banks fell by almost 20 percent between 1984 and 1991.  After the credit crunch period, the banking industry had 
much better performance.  Profits and efficiency rose, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans fell, and risk-
taking and deposit market concentration remained constant (see Berger and Mester, 2003).  
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industry.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the concepts used in 
evaluating banking firm and industry productive efficiency.  Section 3 discusses empirical 
implementation of the concepts.  Section 4 discusses measurement issues that must be confronted when 
bringing the concepts to data.  Section 5 discusses the main empirical findings in the literature related to 
each concept.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Efficiency Concepts 
In investigating the optimal structure of the banking industry and its efficiency, one must start 
with a concept of optimization. As a general definition, efficiency is a measure of deviation between 
actual performance and desired performance.  Thus, efficiency must be measured relative to an objective 
function. A fundamental decision in measuring financial institution efficiency is which concept to use, 
and the choice will depend on the question being asked. 
The concept chosen should be related to economic optimization in reaction to market prices and 
competition, rather than being based solely on the use of technology.  We can ask the question, is the 
bank maximizing the amount of output it produces given its inputs or minimizing the amount of inputs it 
uses to produce a given level of output – i.e., is it operating on its production frontier – but that is a 
question about technological optimization.  This is less interesting from an economic perspective, since it 
ignores values.  It cannot account for allocative inefficiency in mis-responding to relative prices in 
choosing inputs and outputs, and it is difficult to compare firms that tend to specialize in different inputs 
or outputs, because there is no way to compare one input or output with another without the benefit of 
relative prices.  There is also no way to determine whether the output being produced is optimal without 
value information on the outputs. Instead, we would like to investigate questions of economic 
optimization.
6   
For example, is the bank minimizing its costs of production given its choice of inputs, taking  
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input prices as given?  Is the bank maximizing its profits given its choice of inputs and outputs, taking 
input and output prices as given?  A bank might be operating on its production frontier (i.e., not wasting 
resources), and so be technically efficient, but it could still be allocatively inefficient if it is choosing the 
wrong mix of inputs given the relative prices of those inputs.  Similarly, the bank could be technically and 
allocatively efficient in producing its chosen level of output, but it could be choosing the wrong level of 
output in order to maximize profits. 
Figure 1 shows a simple two input, one output case of firm production.  The figure shows an 
isoquant – the combinations of inputs x1 and x2 (say labor and capital) it takes to make output level y0.  
Firm B is technically efficient, since it is operating on the isoquant.  Firm A is inefficient, since it is 
operating interior to the isoquant.  That is, Firm A is using more of inputs x1 and x2 to produce y0 than an 
efficient firm would use.  But note that Firm B could do better as well.  Firm B could lower its costs of 
producing y0 by using a different combination of the inputs, given their prices w1 and w2.  Namely, given 
the prices of the inputs, Firm B would minimize its cost of producing y0 by operating at point O. Firm B 
should use more x1 and less of x2.  Since we want to capture such allocative inefficiency, we want to 
focus on the economic concepts of cost-minimization and profit-maximization, which are based on 
economic optimization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than based solely on the use of 
technology. 
There are different aspects to economic optimization.  Most of the literature focuses on cost 
minimization.  But from a performance standpoint, one might also investigate whether the bank is 
producing the optimal outputs in terms of profitability and firm value.  For this, one can study the profit 
function (and, less commonly, the revenue function).  This is important to the extent that bank output 
quality is a significant choice variable for the bank.  If revenue losses more than counteract cost savings, 
the choice is not profit maximizing.  Profit efficiency includes revenue benefits from improving product 
mix and can reflect the benefits of improved diversification. 
Newer studies acknowledge the fact that the objectives of firm management may differ from cost 
                                                                                                                                                                           
6 For further discussion see Berger and Mester (1997) and Mester (2003).  
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minimization and profit maximization and try to incorporate this into efficiency measurement.  These 
papers focus on more market-based definitions of efficiency, e.g., operation on a risk-return frontier.  
Three main types of efficiency are measured: scale, scope, X-efficiency.  They are used to 
address questions pertaining to different aspects of bank structure. 
What is the optimal scale of operations of the bank?  This is pertinent to the issue of optimal 
structure in terms of number of firms in the industry; is banking a natural monopoly?  Scale economies 
are usually measured with respect to bank costs and refer to how the bank’s scale of operations (its size) 
is related to cost – what percentage increase in costs occurs with a 1 percent increase in scale.  A firm is 
operating at constant returns to scale if, for a given mix of products, a proportionate increase in all its 
outputs would increase its costs by the same proportion; a firm is operating with scale economies if a 
proportionate increase in scale leads to a less than proportionate increase in cost; a firm is operating with 
scale diseconomies if a proportionate increase in scale leads to a more than proportionate increase in cost.  
For single-product firms, operating at the point of constant returns to scale implies operating at minimum 
average cost. 
What is the efficient mix of outputs in banking?  That is, what’s the optimal combination of 
products to minimize cost (or maximize profits)?  This is pertinent to the issue of universal banking and 
the mixing of commercial and investment banking in the aftermath of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  Scope 
economies are usually measured with respect to bank costs and refer to how the bank’s choice of multiple 
product lines is related to cost.  A firm producing multiple products enjoys scope economies if it is less 
costly to produce those products together in a single entity than it would be to separate production into 
specialized firms.
7  A potential source of such scope economies is the opportunity to cross-market new 
and existing products to customers.  For example, the merger of Citibank with Travelers, which had 
bought Smith Barney (which had bought Salomon), brought together commercial banking, securities, and 
insurance products.  On the other hand, the cost of integrating disparate computer systems in order to take 
                                                      
7 Note, I have defined scale and scope economies relative to the costs of production, but they could just as well have 
been defined relative to the bank’s revenues or profits.  
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advantage of such potential cross-marketing opportunities might mitigate any scope economies. 
Given the technology, what percent of banks are using the best-practice methods of production, 
i.e., are operating on the efficient frontier?  X-efficiency measures how productive the firm is in its use of 
inputs to create output.  The concept refers to the dispersion of costs (profits, revenues) in any given 
size/product mix class.  If all firms in an industry are producing the scale and combination of outputs that 
minimize the average cost of production, then the total cost of producing the industry’s output is 
minimized, and the industry is producing the efficient combination and level of products, provided each 
firm is using its inputs efficiently.  Firms that exhibit cost X-inefficiency are either wasting some of their 
inputs (technical inefficiency) or are using the wrong combination of inputs to produce outputs (allocative 
inefficiency), or both.  Management ability (or lack thereof) may be a source of X-inefficiency, but 
managerial preferences might be another source, to the extent that managers can pursue objectives that 
differ from those of stockholders.  For example, managers might derive utility, U, from having large staffs 
or other perquisites, as well as high profits, so that U=U(π,E), where π is profits and E is expenditure on 
labor (or other inputs).  Some studies of commercial banks and savings and loans have found evidence of 
such “expense-preference” behavior; others have found evidence of “empire building,” i.e., pursuit of 
inefficient mergers to gain larger scale and presumably prestige (see Edwards, 1977; Mester, 1989a; 
Mester 1989b; Mester 1991; and Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and Pagano, 2003).  
How has the production technology shifted over time (technological change) and how has 
productivity changed over time?  Productivity is a combination of a shift in the best-practice frontier and 
in dispersion from the frontier (X-inefficiency). 
These concepts can be focused more specifically on the optimality of particular aspects of bank 
strategy.  For example, Berlin and Mester (1998) provide evidence on whether relationship lending is 
efficient.  Banks are able to smooth loan rate for their borrowers with which they have formed a long-
term relationship.  Berlin and Mester (1998) find that loan-rate smoothing in response to a shock to a 
small-business borrower’s credit risk is not efficient, but in response to an interest-rate shock such loan-




3. Empirical Implementation 
3.1. Bank Production.  To bring efficiency concepts to bear in investigating the optimal structure 
of the banking firm, one must begin with a theory of the banking firm – i.e., what do banks do.  Most of 
the literature applies traditional microeconomic theory of firm production to banking firms – a bank is a 
factory producing financial services (like a factory makes widgets).  The newer literature takes seriously 
the bank as a financial intermediary that differs from other types of firms.  Factors important for banks 
that have generally been ignored in much of the literature include the bank’s choice of risk and 
diversification of assets; asset quality and its feedback on the bank’s input prices; and the bank’s financial 
capital structure.  The newer literature combines the theory of financial intermediation with the 
microeconomics of bank production (see Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000; Hughes 1999; Hughes, 
Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1999; and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001). 
In the standard application of efficiency analysis to banking, bank production decisions do not 
affect bank risk.  The bank is assumed to take the entire price of its outputs and inputs as given.  This 
rules out the possibility that scale-related improvements in diversification could lower the cost of 
borrowed funds and induce banks to alter their exposure to risk.  In contrast, the newer research 
recognizes the bank’s role as a monitor and producer of information and the bank as a manager of risk.  
The theory of the banking firm emphasizes the bank’s role in producing information about its borrowers.  
Hence, output measures should attempt to proxy for these aspects of banking.  One study, Mester (1992), 
directly accounted for the monitoring and screening role of banks in measuring bank output by treating 
loans purchased and originated loans as separate outputs entailing different types of screening, and 
treating loans held on balance sheet and loans sold as separate outputs entailing different types of 
monitoring. 
The bank’s choice of capital structure (funding choices regarding capital and debt) and its 
strategic decisions regarding asset quality vary with production decisions.  Thus, part of the input and 
output prices a bank faces are not exogenous – the risk premium in these prices is partly endogenous as it  
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depends on the bank’s production choices.  This affects the modeling of banking production and therefore 
measurement of scale and scope economies (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000; Hughes, 1999).  
But in standard efficiency studies, the bank is assumed to choose a production plan to minimize cost and 
maximize profits given the prices of inputs and outputs (including the required return on shareholders’ 
equity).  That is, the standard assumption is that the required return on debt and equity is independent of 
production decisions of the firm. The higher moments of cost and profit are assumed not to vary across 
banks.  In newer research, banks are modeled as taking actions that will maximize their market value – 
since production decisions affect bank risk, they affect the discount rate applied to evaluating discounted 
present value.  Production decisions that increase expected profit but also the discount rate applied to that 
profit may not increase the bank’s market value. The optimal production choices depend not only on the 
expected profits they generate but also on the variability of the profit stream generated.  The newer 
research tries to evaluate the tradeoff between expected return and riskiness of that return. 
The newer theory also recognizes that bank managers may be making production decisions that 
are not value-maximizing because of agency problems between owners and managers.  The researcher 
has data on the decisions managers are actually making, which need not be value-maximizing decisions.  
Measurement of scale and scope economies and X-efficiency should take this into account.    
3.2. Cost Minimization.  The second step in empirical implementation is to decide which 
optimization goal to investigate, e.g., cost, profits, revenue.  The earliest literature assumed that the bank 
produced a single output.  Once techniques were developed for measuring scale and scope economies at 
multiproduct firms (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982), these techniques were applied to financial 
institutions. 
In a cost function, variable costs depend on the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable 
outputs, any fixed inputs or outputs, and environmental factors, as well as an error term.  If the error term 
includes only random error and not the possibility of X-inefficiency, then the estimated cost function is an 
average-practice cost function, describing the average relationship between costs, outputs, and input 
prices.  If the error term includes a term representing random error and a term representing X- 
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inefficiency, then the estimated cost function is a best-practice frontier, which indicates the cost of a bank 
producing using the best practices under ideal conditions.  (Note, this does not necessarily represent the 
best possible practice, merely the best practice observed among banks in the sample.  See Berger and 
Mester, 1997.)  Such a cost function is often written in logarithmic form: 
ln Ci = ln f(yi, wi, zi, hi) + ui + vi, (1) 
where C measures variable costs, w is the vector of prices of variable inputs, y is the vector of quantities 
of variable outputs, z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs, such as physical 
plant, which cannot be changed quickly), h is a set of environmental or market variables that may affect 
performance (e.g., regulatory restrictions) but are not a choice for firm management, ui denotes an 
inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best-practice level, and vi denotes the random error that 
incorporates measurement error and luck that may temporarily give firms high or low costs.  The 
inefficiency factor ui incorporates both allocative inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative 
prices of inputs, w, and technical inefficiencies from employing too much of the inputs to produce y. 
The function f denotes some functional form and represents the best-practice frontier.  The term, 
ui + vi , is treated as a composite error term: vi is a two-sided error, since random measurement error or 
luck can be positive or negative, and ui is a one-sided (positive) error, since inefficiency means higher 
costs.  The various X-efficiency measurement techniques use different methods to identify the 
inefficiency term, ui, as distinct from the random error term, vi.
Scale economies measure the percentage change in costs per one percent increase in all the 
outputs, as given by the frontier.  Consider composite output bundle y
0, and suppose y = ty























,  (2)   
where N = number of outputs. 
There are scale economies (i.e., increasing returns to scale) if SCALE > 1; scale diseconomies 
(i.e., decreasing returns to scale) if SCALE < 1; and constant returns to scale if SCALE = 1.  Note that for  
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single-product firms, choosing y such that SCALE = 1 minimizes the average cost of production. 
Scope economies measure whether it is less costly for a multiproduct firm to produce the outputs 
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Several criticisms have been levied at the scope economies measure.  First, it requires evaluation 
of the cost function at zero output levels.  This rules out certain functional forms, such as the translog, in 
which outputs appear in logarithmic form.  Researchers have handled this either by replacing the zero 
output with a very small positive number or by selecting a functional form that permits zero output levels 
(e.g., the hybrid translog function which replaces ln yi in the translog cost function with yi transformed by 
the Box-Cox metric, i.e., [(yi
λ −1)/ λ], where λ is a parameter to be estimated). 
A more telling criticism of the conventional measure of scope economies is that it requires the 
cost function to be evaluated at zero output levels even if all firms in the sample are producing positive 
levels of each output, as they often are in banking studies.  So the scope measure involves extrapolation 
outside the sample.  This problem is not resolved by functional forms such as the hybrid translog, which 
permit evaluation at zero output.  Mester (1991) proposes a new measure, Within-Sample Scope 
Economies, which avoids extrapolation. 
min min min min min min min
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min is the minimum value of yi in the sample.  The specialized firms in the within-sample measure 
produce positive amounts of each output but tend to specialize in one or the other. 
The cost X-inefficiency of any bank i would be measured relative to the best-practice frontier.  
Note that the best-practice frontier refers to the best practice observed in the industry and not true 
minimum cost, which is not observable.  Conceptually, the cost inefficiency of bank i measures the  
 
14 
percentage increase in cost of bank i, adjusted for random error, relative to the estimated cost needed to 
produce bank i’s output vector if the firm were as efficient as the best-practice firm in the sample facing 
the same exogenous variables (w,y,z,v).
8  It can be thought of as the proportion of costs or resources that 
are used inefficiently or wasted.  Figure 2 shows an example.  The estimated cost frontier is given by ln f.  
Bank j is fully efficient.  Its actual cost lies below the frontier due to random error.  Bank i is inefficient.  
The difference in bank i’s cost and the frontier value at the same y is due to both random error, vi, and 
inefficiency, ui.  Cost inefficiency would include both technical inefficiency (operating in the interior of 
the production possibilities frontier) and allocative inefficiency (operating at a point on the production 
possibilities frontier that is not cost-minimizing). 
If time-series or panel data are available, then productivity growth can be measured. Productivity 
growth is a combination of technological change, which is given by shifts in the frontier over time, and 
changes in inefficiency, which are changes in dispersion around the frontier.  Berger and Mester (2003) 
define cost productivity growth as the change in cost from period t to period t+k holding constant the 
exogenous environmental variables, which they term “business conditions,” at their period t levels.  It is 
important to control for these business conditions to avoid attributing a change in costs that is not due to 
bank managers’ decisions or skill to a change in productivity. 
3.3. Profit Maximization.  The bank should minimize the cost of producing a given output 
bundle, but that output bundle should be chosen to maximize profits.  Standard profit efficiency measures 
how close a firm is to producing the maximum possible profit given a particular level of input prices and 
output prices (and fixed netputs and environmental variables).  In contrast to the cost function, the 
standard profit function specifies variable profits in place of variable costs and takes variable output 
prices as given, rather than holding all output quantities statistically fixed at their observed, possibly 
inefficient, levels.  That is, the dependent variable in the profit function allows for consideration of 
revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs.  Output prices are taken as exogenous, 
allowing for inefficiencies in the choice of outputs when responding to these prices or to any other 
                                                      
8 To see this, note that, ignoring random error, ui = ln Ci – ln f(yi, wi, zi, hi).  
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arguments of the profit function. 
The standard profit function, in log form, is: 
ln (π+θ)i = ln g(pi, wi, zi, hi) − uπi + vπi, (5) 
where π is the variable profits of the firm; θ is a constant added to every firm’s profit so that the natural 
log is taken of a positive number; p is the vector of prices of the variable outputs; vπi, represents random 
error; and uπi represents inefficiency that reduces profits.   
Similar to cost X-inefficiency, profit X-inefficiency is defined as that amount of profit that is not 
being earned compared to the predicted maximum profit that could be earned if the firm were as efficient 
as the best-practice firm.  Thus, it is the percentage of profits that is left on the table, so to speak.  Similar 
to cost productivity growth, profit productivity growth is the change in profit from period t to period t+k 
holding constant the exogenous environmental variables (“business conditions”) at their period t levels. 
As discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), profit efficiency is a more comprehensive measure of 
performance than is cost efficiency, since it accounts for errors on the output side as well as those on the 
input side.  It is based on the economic goal of profit maximization, which requires that the same amount 
of managerial attention be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of 
costs.  That is, a firm that spends $1 additional to raise revenues by $2, all else held equal, would 
appropriately be measured as being more profit efficient but might inappropriately be measured as being 
less cost efficient.  Note that cost efficiency evaluates performance, holding output constant at its current 
level, which generally will not correspond to an optimum.  A firm that is relatively cost efficient at its 
current output may or may not be cost efficient at its optimal output, which typically involves a different 
scale and mix of outputs.  Standard profit efficiency embodies the cost inefficiency deviations from the 
optimal point, as well as revenue inefficiencies.
9
                                                      
9 Berger and Mester (1997) discuss another type of profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency.  This concept is 
based on estimates of the alternative profit function, which substitutes output levels for output prices in the 
specification of the profit function.  This function is estimated to provide additional information when the 
maintained assumptions underlying the standard profit function do not hold.  It may provide useful information if 
there are unmeasured differences in output qualities across firms; outputs are not completely variable; output 
markets are not perfectly competitive; or output prices are not accurately measured.  
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3.4. More Complicated Objectives.  As discussed earlier, the standard concepts of cost 
minimization or profit maximization may not be the only goals being pursued by the firms’ managers, and 
some studies have incorporated more complicated objectives. Explicitly recognizing the tradeoff between 
return and risk, where risk is a choice variable of the firm, would seem to be an important consideration 
for financial institutions (see Hughes, 1999; and Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000; and Hughes, 
Mester, and Moon, 2001).  For example, an increase in a bank’s scale of operations may allow it to reduce 
its exposure to both credit and liquidity risk through diversification.  All else equal, this could mean scale 
economies in risk management costs.  But all else is not equal: by reducing the risk attached to any given 
production plan, better diversification can decrease the marginal cost of risk-taking and lead banks to take 
on more risk to earn a greater return.  Not accounting for risk when specifying the production structure 
can obscure scale economies, since additional risk-taking is costly in terms of the additional resources 
needed to manage the risk and the higher risk premium that has to be paid to attract uninsured funding.  
When exposure to risk is influenced by production decisions, then cost minimization and profit 
maximization need not coincide with value maximization.  Estimates of efficiency that are derived from 
cost and profit functions may be mismeasured, since they do not penalize suboptimal choices of risk and 
quality that then affect prices.  Moreover, if the managers are able to make choices in their own interest 
rather than on behalf of the owners of the firm (the stockholders), i.e., if the market for corporate control 
does not discipline managers, then the choices of risk versus return need not be value-maximizing either.  
Recognition that managers make decisions introduces the possibility of agency problems that also need to 
be considered in measuring efficiency. 
If firms take risk as well as profit into account when making production decisions, then the model 
of production against which efficiency is evaluated would need to include this.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, 
Moon (1996, 2000) construct a model of firm production that incorporates the risk-return tradeoff.  
Managers’ most preferred production plan maximizes a utility function that accounts for how the 
probability distribution of profit depends on the production plan.  Duality theory is used to derive the 
most preferred input and profit demand equations from the expenditure function.  These demand  
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functions are those that maximize the managers’ utility function.  The managers’ demand for financial 
capital can also be estimated along with the input and profit demand equations.
10  
Hughes, Mester, Moon (2001) develop measures of efficiency based on the expected return-risk 
tradeoff implied by the production model.  ER is the firm’s predicted profit, as calculated from the 
estimated profit-share equation from the model, divided by the firm’s equity level.  RK is the standard 
error of predicted profit divided by equity.  The authors show that ER and RK are systematically related to 
the market value of equity for the subsample of publicly traded banks, so they can be used to derive 
market return efficiency measures.  A risk-return frontier is then estimated: 
ERi = Г0 + Г1 RKi + Г2 RKi
2 + vi  − ui, (6) 
where vi  is a two-sided error term representing random error, and ui is a one-sided error term representing 
inefficiency.  An inefficiency measure based on this frontier would give the increase in expected return 
that would occur if the firm moved to the frontier, holding risk constant.  That is, it identifies lost 
potential return given the firm’s level of return risk. One can identify the group of banks that are most 
efficient (say, the quarter of banks with the lowest levels of measured inefficiency) as those that are 
value-maximizing banks.
11
We can generalize the efficient frontier given in equation (6) so that it applies to more 
complicated objectives (see Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, 2000).  If Xi denotes a measure of the financial 
performance of firm i, e.g., profit, or the market value of its assets, and Gi denotes a measure defining the 
                                                      
10 The functional forms for the utility-maximizing input and profit equations can be derived from the Almost Ideal 
Demand System.  These equations are conditioned on the level of financial capital.  A second stage can be added to 
the utility maximization problem to determine the bank mangers’ choice of financial capital, and this demand 
function can be estimated along with the input and profit demand equations.  
11 Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) present two other efficiency measures.  Instead of holding risk constant 
and comparing the bank’s expected return to the expected return it would have if it were on the frontier and had the 
same level of risk, these measures compare the bank’s expected return and risk with the expected return and risk it 
would have if it moved to the frontier along the shortest path to the frontier.  This shortest path is along the ray that 
is orthogonal to the frontier.  These measures have a drawback in that they cannot account for random error’s effect 
on the placement of the bank relative to the frontier. 
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) present two additional efficiency measures.  For publicly traded bank 
holding companies they derive an efficiency measure based on estimating a frontier that relates the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets, and they derive another efficiency measure based on estimating a frontier that 
relates the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  These measures indicate the bank holding company’s 
lost potential market value of equity or assets based on the book value of equity or assets, respectively.    
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peer group used to compare firm i’s financial performance, e.g., risk or the market value of assets, the 
general form of the frontier, which gives the highest potential value of Xi given Gi is: 
Xi  =  α0 + α1 Gi + α2 (Gi )
2 +  vi  −  ui, (7) 
where vi is a two-sided random error term with zero mean, and ui is a one-sided error term representing 
inefficiency.  (Note that more flexible function forms than the quadratic could be specified.)  For 
example, financial performance, X, might be measured by predicted profit from an estimated model and G 
might be measured by risk, e.g., the firm’s interest-rate beta, or by size, e.g., its equity or asset level.  
Note that for any G, the optimality of the choice of G is not taken into account when measuring 
efficiency.  That is, if G is risk, then a firm’s performance would be compared only to those taking on the 
same level of risk.  The firm would not be penalized for a suboptimal choice of risk that lowered 
performance. 
Expense-preference is one particular form of X-inefficiency, in which firm managers are assumed 
to derive utility from choosing a greater than efficient (i.e., cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing) level 
of one or more of the firm’s inputs, usually labor.  That is, the managerial utility function is U=U(π, E), 
where E represents expenditures on the input.  
Tests for expense preference are based on estimating input demand functions or cost functions.  
The functional forms are derived explicitly from the utility function, which depends on the underlying 
production function of the firm.  Edwards (1977) derived the demand for labor equation for a firm using a 
Cobb-Douglas production function and exhibiting expense preference for labor.  Mester (1989b) 
generalizes expense-preference tests to allow for less restrictive production structures and the presence of 
expense-preference toward any input, not just labor.  Note that the derived tests in both of these studies 
cannot give firm-specific measures of inefficiency.  Rather they are tests of whether a group of firms is 
showing expense-preference toward any input.  
 
4. Measurement 
Even after the appropriate concept or goal against which efficiency is to be evaluated is chosen,  
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certain issues need to be confronted before the estimates can be obtained.  These include estimation 
technique; specification of the functional form of the frontier; variables to include in the frontier; and data 
measurement issues. 
  4.1 Estimation Techniques.  Different methods have been developed to identify the inefficiency 
component from the random noise component in frontier estimation.  Common frontier efficiency 
estimation techniques are data envelopment analysis (DEA), free disposable hull analysis (FDH), the 
stochastic frontier approach, the thick frontier approach, and the distribution-free approach.  The first two 
of these are nonparametric techniques, and the latter three are parametric methods (see Berger and 
Mester, 1997, for further discussion of these techniques). 
My preference is for the parametric techniques. The nonparametric methods generally ignore 
prices and can, therefore, account only for technical inefficiency in using too many inputs or producing 
too few outputs (as discussed above).  Another drawback is that they usually do not allow for random 
error in the data, assuming away measurement error and luck as factors affecting outcomes (although 
some progress is being made in this regard by using bootstrapping methods).  In effect, they disentangle 
efficiency differences from random error by assuming that random error is zero!  To see the effect of 
measurement error, consider Figure 3.  The true data for a set of banks are given by the squares.  The true 
frontier for this set of banks is indicated by the brown line.  The measured data for these banks are 
indicated by the circles.  The frontier determined by DEA using the measured data is given by the black 
line.  Now consider Banks B and C.   The researcher using DEA and ignoring measurement error would 
conclude that Bank C is not on the frontier and that Bank B is more efficient than Bank C.  But the data 
are measured with error, and Bank C is actually more efficient than Bank B.  The researcher would not 
know the true data but would need to allow for the possibility that the data are measured with error to 
avoid erroneous conclusions. 
In the parametric methods, a bank is labeled inefficient if it is behaving less than optimally with 
respect to the specified goal – e.g., costs are higher or profits are lower – than the frontier value.  The 
estimation methods differ in the way ui is disentangled from the composite error term ui + vi.  A drawback  
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of the parametric methods is that assumptions must be made about the shape of the frontier and the 
distribution of the inefficiency term.  However, sufficient flexibility can usually be introduced so that the 
stochastic methods dominate the nonparametric methods in my opinion.  
In the stochastic frontier approach, the inefficiency and random error components of the 
composite error term are disentangled by making explicit assumptions about their distributions.  The 
random error term, vi, is assumed to be two-sided (usually normally distributed), and the inefficiency 
term, ui, is assumed to be one-sided (usually half-normally distributed).  The parameters of the two 
distributions are estimated and can be used to obtain estimates of firm-specific inefficiency.  The 
estimated mean of the conditional distribution of ui given ui + vi, i.e.,  ii i i ˆ ˆ u E(u  (u +v )) ≡ is usually used to 
measure inefficiency.  The distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach are fairly 
arbitrary, and sometimes the residuals are not skewed in the direction predicted by the assumptions of the 
stochastic frontier approach, so that estimates are not obtainable. 
If panel data are available, some of these maintained distributional assumptions can be relaxed, 
and the distribution-free approach may be used.  This method assumes that there is a core efficiency or 
average efficiency for each firm over time.  The core inefficiency is distinguished from random error 
(including any temporary fluctuations in inefficiency) by assuming that core inefficiency is persistent 
over time, while random errors tend to average out over time.  In particular, a cost or profit function is 
estimated for each period of a panel data set.  The residual in each separate regression is composed of 
both inefficiency, ui, and random error, vi, but the random component, vi, is assumed to average out over 
time, so that an estimate of the inefficiency term, u ˆ  ≡ the average of a firm’s residuals from all of the 
regressions = average (ui+vi) = average (ui).
12  The reasonableness of the maintained assumptions about 
the error term components depends on the length of the period studied.  If too short a period is chosen, the 
random errors might not average out, in which case random error would be attributed to inefficiency 
(although truncation can help).  If too long a period is chosen, the firm’s core efficiency becomes less  
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meaningful because of changes in management and other events, i.e., it might not be constant over the 
time period.  
4.2 Functional Form, Variable Selection, and Variable Measurement.  The next step in the 
parametric estimation methods is choice of functional form for the frontier, including variable selection 
and measurement.  The most popular form in the literature for cost and profit functions is the translog.  
The Fourier-flexible functional form augments the translog by including Fourier trigonometric terms, 
which makes it more flexible than the translog.  Berger and Mester (1997) found that there was only a 
small difference in average efficiency and very little difference in efficiency dispersion or rank between 
cost or profit efficiency estimates based on the translog functional form and those based on the Fourier-
flexible functional form.  While formal statistical tests indicated that the coefficients on the Fourier terms 
were jointly significant at the 1 percent level, the average improvement in goodness of fit was small and 
was not significant from an economic point of view. 
Once the objective and functional form are selected, the next decision is the variables to include 
in the function and proxies for those variables.  Ideally, the frontier to be estimated should be derived 
from first principles.  For example, if the objective is cost minimization, the cost function should be 
derived based on the specified production technology.  Variables to include in the cost function would be 
those indicated by the theory of duality – output levels, input prices, netputs (factors that the firm cannot 
vary over the short run, which are measured in levels), and environmental variables (to account for 
differences across the firms’ environments or markets, which may affect performance but are not a choice 
for firm management).  For example, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000) derive the profit and input 
demand functions by applying Shephard’s Lemma to the managerial expenditure function (based on the 
Almost Ideal Demand System), which is dual to the managerial utility maximization problem, in which 
managers trade off risk and return.  These equations include revenue terms, the tax rate, and risk terms, 
which would not be included in the functions were the managers maximizing profits.  Hence, the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
12 For banks with very low or very high u ˆ , an adjustment (called truncation) is made to assign less extreme values of 
u ˆ  to these banks, since extreme values may indicate that random error, vi , has not been completely purged by  
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coefficients on these terms offer a test of profit maximization versus utility maximization.
13  Other 
models would lead to other specifications. 
In any of the estimation techniques, X-efficiency is essentially the residual.  This means that 
omitted variables (or extraneous variables) can have large effects on measured efficiency.  Specification 
of included variables is important, since the methodology depends on comparing the firm’s cost or profit 
or market value, etc., to those of a best-practice firm operating at the same level of the exogenous 
variables included in the frontier.  That is, the exogenous variables determine the reference set for the 
firm whose efficiency is being measured.  If something extraneous is included in the frontier 
specification, then one might mislabel a firm as efficient because the estimation would be comparing 
firms in too narrow a reference set and not the entire set of relevant firms.  For example, if two firms 
differ only in that one’s CEO is blond and one is a brunette – which I’m assuming is unrelated to 
efficiency! – then we would want to consider these two firms in the same reference set and compare their 
costs to one another.  If we included CEO hair color in the cost function as a dummy variable, we would 
preclude such a comparison.  We might want to include in the specification of the frontier variables that 
account for differences in the environment in which the firm operates that are exogenous to the firm’s 
decision-making but that may affect performance, e.g., we might want to include variables that account 
for demand, such as income growth in the firm’s market, or whether the firm is located in an urban or 
rural market.  Then in measuring efficiency, the urban firms would be compared to other urban firms and 
the rural firms to rural firms.  But note that the manager’s potentially inefficient choice of where to set up 
shop – in a rural or an urban market – would not be penalized.  The alternative is to leave the variable out 
of the frontier specification but then determine whether the efficiency estimates are correlated with the 
variable.  For example, Mester, 1993; Mester, 1996; and Mester, 1997; and Berger and Mester, 1997 have 
looked at correlations between efficiency measures and various exogenous factors.  Judgment has to be 
used about the better way to proceed, including the variables as part of the frontier or excluding them and 




looking at correlations. 
4.3 Special Issues in Banking.  Judgment also has to be used when applying efficiency 
techniques to certain industries.  The special issues that arise in applying the techniques to the banking 
industry are suggestive of some of the problems and issues that can arise in efficiency estimation in 
general.  In banking, an important issue has been how to measure outputs and inputs. There has been 
some disagreement in the literature over what a commercial bank is actually producing.  Two general 
approaches have been taken: the “production” approach and the “intermediation” approach (also called 
the “asset” approach). 
The production approach focuses on the bank’s operating costs, i.e., the costs of labor 
(employees) and physical capital (plant and equipment).  The bank’s outputs are measured by the number 
of each type of account, such as commercial and industrial loans, mortgages, deposits, etc. because it is 
thought that most of the operating costs are incurred by processing account documents and debiting and 
crediting accounts; inputs are labor and physical capital. 
The “intermediation” approach considers a financial firm’s production process to be one of financial 
intermediation, i.e., the borrowing of funds and the subsequent lending of those funds.  Thus, the focus is on 
total costs, including both interest and operating expenses.  Outputs are measured by the dollar volume of 
each of the bank’s different types of loans, and inputs are labor, physical capital, deposits and other 
borrowed funds, and, in some studies, financial capital.
14  The studies on X-efficiency in banking have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000) reject the hypothesis of profit maximization using 1989-1990 data on 
U.S. banks that reported at least $1 billion in assets as of the last quarter of 1998. 
14 A slight variation on the intermediation approach, which has been used in some studies, is to distinguish between 
transactions deposits, which are treated as an output, since they can serve as a measure of the amount of transactions 
services the bank produces, and purchased or borrowed funds (such as federal funds or large CDs purchased from 
another bank), which are treated as inputs, since the bank does not produce services in obtaining these funds.  The strict 
intermediation approach would consider the transactions services produced by the bank as an intermediate output, 
something that must be produced along the way toward the bank’s final output of earning assets.  Hughes and Mester 
(1993) empirically tested whether deposits should be treated as an input or output and found support that they should be 
treated as an input in their study.  
  Another approach that has been taken less often is the “value-added” approach, which considers all liabilities 
and assets of the bank to have at least some of the characteristics of an output.  Still another approach, taken in Mester 
(1992), is to consider the bank’s output to be its loan origination and loan monitoring services, since these outputs are 
more closely related to the theory of financial intermediation.  
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tended to use the intermediation approach.
15
Theoretically, to compare one firm’s efficiency to another’s, we would like to compare each firm’s 
cost of producing the same outputs.  For banks, significant characteristics are loan quality, which reflects the 
amount of monitoring the bank does to keep the loan performing, and the riskiness of the bank’s portfolio.  
Unless these characteristics are controlled for, one might conclude a bank was producing in a very efficient 
manner if it were spending far less to produce a given output level, but its output might be highly risky and 
of a lower quality than that of another bank.  It would be wrong to say a bank was efficient if it were 
scrimping on the credit evaluation needed to produce sound loans.  Thus, recent studies have included 
quality and nonperforming loans in the specifications of cost and profit functions.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, 
and Moon (2000) derive the risk-return tradeoff explicitly from a utility maximization model rather than just 
augmenting the cost and profit functions with risk and quality measures.  See Hughes (1999) for further 
discussion. 
Unfortunately, there are likely to be unmeasured differences in quality because the banking data 
do not fully capture the heterogeneity in bank output.  The amount of service flow associated with 
financial products is by necessity usually assumed to be proportionate to the dollar value of the stock of 
assets or liabilities on the balance sheet, which can result in significant mismeasurement.  For example, 
commercial loans can vary in size, repayment schedule, risk, transparency of information, type of 
collateral, covenants to be enforced, etc.  These differences are likely to affect the costs to the bank of 
loan origination, ongoing monitoring and control, and financing expense.  Unmeasured differences in 
product quality may be incorrectly measured as differences in cost inefficiency. 
Another issue raised in recent papers in the bank efficiency literature is the treatment of financial 
capital.
16  As discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), a bank’s insolvency risk depends not only on the 
riskiness of its portfolio but on the amount of financial capital it has to absorb losses.  Insolvency risk 
                                                      
15 As discussed earlier, Mester (1992) took a different approach and specified outputs that were more directly related 
to the monitoring and screening services performed by the bank: loans originated, loans purchased, loans originated 
or purchased earlier and held on balance sheet, and loans sold.  
16 The discussion of the role of financial capital is taken mainly from Berger and Mester (1997).  
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affects bank costs and profits via the risk premium the bank has to pay for uninsured debt, through the 
intensity of risk management activities the bank undertakes and (as discussed in Hughes, 1999, and 
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000) through the discount rate applied to future profits.  Thus, the 
bank’s financial capital should be considered when studying efficiency.  To some extent, controlling for 
the interest rates paid on uninsured debt helps account for differences in risk, but these rates are 
imperfectly measured.  
Even apart from risk, a bank’s capital level directly affects costs by providing an alternative to 
deposits as a funding source for loans.  In most studies, interest paid on debt (deposits) is counted as a 
cost, but dividends paid are not.  On the other hand, raising equity typically involves higher costs than 
raising deposits.  If the first effect dominates, measured costs will be higher for banks using a higher 
proportion of debt financing; if the second effect dominates, measured costs will be lower for these banks. 
Studies that have considered financial capital include the level of capital rather than its price.  
Including the price assumes that banks on the frontier are selecting the cost-minimizing level of capital. 
This might not be the case because of regulations that set a minimum capital-to-asset ratio or because of 
risk-aversion on the part of bank managers.  See Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion.   
To summarize, the review above discusses some of the steps that need to be followed in 
implementing efficiency measurement.  The main steps involve choosing the efficiency concept, i.e., firm 
objective function (this includes specification of the production function of the firm), estimation 
technique, functional form, and variables and their proxies. 
 
5. Empirical Findings in the Literature 
There is a vast literature on efficiency at commercial banks, and there have been several 
comprehensive reviews of the literature, e.g., Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993), Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), and Berger (2003).  Here, I focus on several overall impressions that can be drawn from the 
literature rather than a comprehensive review. 
5.1 Scale Economies.  The evidence on scale economies has been changing over time as more  
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complicated and realistic models have been applied to the data.  Early studies using data from the 1980s 
failed to find scale economies beyond a very small bank size – up to about $100 million in assets.  Later 
studies using data from the 1990s have found scale economies in a range of up to about $10 billion.  And 
the latest studies (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; Hughes, Mester, Moon, 2001; Bossone and Lee, 2004) 
which incorporate banks’ risk preferences and financial capital into bank production models find scale 
economies for the very largest banks in the sample, up to at least $25 billion in assets.  For example, 
Berger and Mester (1997) incorporated asset quality and financial capital into the cost function, and using 
the sample of almost 6,000 U.S. commercial banks that were in continuous existence over the six-year 
period 1990-1995, found significant cost scale economies for banks in each size class, with estimates 
suggesting that the typical bank would have to be two to three times larger in order to maximize cost scale 
efficiency for its product mix and input prices.  
The difference in results between the earlier and later studies may partly reflect improvements in 
the technologies used for bank intermediation and the relaxation of geographic restrictions on 
competition.  Improvements in information processing, automated loan systems, and credit scoring may 
have reduced costs of extending loans more for large banks than for smaller banks.  The removal of 
geographic branching restrictions may have made it less costly to become large.   
There also may be some measurement issues involved.  Studies that have focused on smaller 
banks and studies that have focused on larger banks have tended to find scale economies exhausted at 
different sizes.  For example, studies that used only banks with under $1 billion in assets (and used the 
standard approach which did not incorporate risk or financial capital) usually found average costs to be 
minimized between about $75 million and $300 million in assets, while studies that used only banks with 
over $1 billion in assets usually found the minimum average cost point to be between $2 billion and $10 
billion in assets (see Berger, Hunter, and Timme, 1993).  This suggests that a single function may not be 
able to incorporate both large and small bank technologies or that some important factor that varies with 
bank size is excluded from the model.  There is conflicting evidence on this point.  McAllister and 
McManus (1993) found that the translog is not a good global approximation to banks of all sizes.  Berger  
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and Mester (1997) found that while the coefficients on the Fourier terms in the Fourier-flexible functional 
form were jointly significantly different from zero, the improvement in the goodness of fit of the Fourier 
over the translog was small and not economically significant.  Both functional forms yield essentially the 
same average level and dispersion of measured efficiency and both ranked the individual banks in almost 
the same order.  
But the later studies’ finding of significant scale economies likely also reflects improvements in 
the methods used to measure scale economies – in particular, accounting for the bank’s choice of risk and 
financial capital.  As discussed in Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001), the standard model ignores the fact 
that bank risk is endogenous.  A larger scale of operations may allow the bank to be better diversified.  
Better diversification can lead to reduced liquidity risk on the liability side of the balance sheet and 
reduced credit risk on the asset side of the balance sheet, which can mean reduced costs of risk 
management.  The bank might be able to economize on financial capital, a relatively expensive source of 
funds, to the extent that diversification lowers banks’ insolvency risk.  Also, the cost of funds might 
decline as banks grow in size if large depositors and other creditors perceive that regulators consider some 
banks are “too-big-to-fail.”
17  
Better diversification leading to reduced marginal cost of risk-taking and reduced marginal cost 
of risk management, all else equal, is the usual diversification effect.  But all else is not necessarily equal, 
because risk-taking is endogenous.  Banks might respond to the lower cost of risk management by taking 
on more risk.  In turn, banks may have to spend more to manage the increased risk.  This risk-taking 
effect may offset the diversification effect, and the potential economies that follow from scale-related 
diversification may be obscured.  Thus, to unmask scale economies due to better diversification it is 
important to incorporate risk into the analysis.  It is also important to account for the fact that bank 
managers need not be holding the level of financial capital that minimizes costs.  As discussed in Hughes 
and Mester (1998), financial capital is the bank’s own bet on its management of risk, so it provides a 
                                                      
17 Hughes and Mester (1993) find evidence of “too-big-to-fail”: for large banks, an increase in size, holding default 
risk and asset quality constant is associated with a significantly lower price of uninsured deposits.  
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credible signal to depositors and creditors of the resources allocated to preserve capital and reduce 
insolvency risk.  As a bank’s scale increases, its loan portfolio and deposit base become more diversified.  
Diversification reduces the cost of the signaling, since the same degree of protection against financial 
distress can be attained at a lower capital-to-asset ratio.  Larger scale also reduces the level of the signal 
required, to the extent that outsiders infer the bank’s level of diversification from the bank’s scale of 
operations, which is observable. 
Using 1989 and 1990 data on U.S. banks with assets over $1 billion, Hughes and Mester (1998) 
find evidence that: financial capital is a signal of risk, banks do not hold the cost-minimizing level of 
capital, the level of capitalization increases less than proportionally with assets, and there are significant 
scale economies at even the largest banks in the sample (which is $74 billion). 
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) undertake a systematic study of bank cost models and find that 
estimated scale economies depend critically on how banks’ capital structure and risk-taking are modeled.  
Using 1994 data on highest-level bank holding companies in the U.S., they find that a standard cost 
function that omits equity capital and a standard cost function that incorporates capital structure and the 
cost of capital both generally yield estimates of constant returns to scale across bank holding companies 
in the sample.  However, regressing the bank-specific scale economies measures on variables accounting 
for sources of risk-taking and diversification, they show that better diversification is associated with 
larger scale economies, while increased risk-taking is related to smaller scale economies.  They also find 
that a proportional variation in size and diversification, controlling for sources of risk-taking, yields a 
statistically and economically significant increase in scale economies, and that by the criterion of cost 
minimization, smaller banks overutilize capital, while larger banks underutilize capital.  These results 
suggest that scale economies might be masked by the banks’ endogenous choice of risk, which needs to 
be modeled.   
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) verify this by estimating the managers’ most-preferred 
production model that includes equity capital, in addition to debt, and models bank managers as 
maximizing utility as a function of expected profits and risk.  This allows banks to be value-maximizers  
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rather than profit-maximizers and allows the bank’s production choices to reflect risk management 
concerns.  Calculating the change in cost as output is expanded so as to maximize utility, they find that 
banks have large scale economies that increase with size.  Since agency problems between owners and 
managers might mean utility-maximizing managers might not choose value-maximizing production plans, 
the value-maximizing banks are identified as those that make efficient risk-return tradeoffs.  Restricting 
attention to the most efficient quarter of banks in each of five size groups and calculating the change in 
cost as output is expanded so as to maximize utility, they again find that banks have large scale 
economies that increase with size.  By incorporating capital structure and risk-taking into models of bank 
production they have uncovered the scale economies that are often cited by merging banks but that can be 
obscured in the standard models, which ignore the endogeneity of the bank’s choice of risk.  
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000) also measure scale economies along the value-maximizing 
expansion path using 1990 data on banks with greater than $1 billion in assets.  Banks in all size quartiles 
were found to be operating with significant scale economies. 
Bossone and Lee (2004) apply the methods of Hughes and Mester (1998), and Hughes, Mester, and 
Moon (2001) to study the relationship between productive efficiency and the size of the financial system. 
Using a sample of 875 commercial banks from 75 countries, they estimate a cost function and measure scale 
economies, allowing for the banks’ endogenous choice of risk and financial capital.  (For comparison, they 
also estimate the standard measure of scale economies, which does not incorporate risk and financial 
capital).  Size of the financial system is proxied by three measures: absolute size, which is the sum of 
domestic credit, domestic deposits, foreign assets, and foreign liabilities of the banking system; relative size 
or financial depth, which is the ratio of absolute size to the level of GDP; and financial market size, which is 
stock market capitalization to GDP × stock market total value traded to GDP × stock market turnover to 
GDP.  They find the presence of significant scale economies that are increasing with the size of the financial 
system, for each of the three measures of size.  (Similar to the results in Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001), 
these scale economies are not uncovered using the standard cost function, which doesn’t incorporate risk 
and financial capital.)  They also find that small banks in larger financial systems are more cost efficient  
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than small banks in small systems, and that scale economies are less variable across bank size, holding the 
financial system size constant, than they are across financial system size, holding bank size constant.  They 
interpret their findings as evidence of what they call “systemic scale economies,” that is, economies derived 
from operating in a larger financial system.  For example, it might be less costly for a bank operating in a 
large financial system if a larger payment system charges lower fees to banks using its services or if a larger 
financial system makes it easier to diversify across products or geography, thereby allowing banks to save 
on capital costs. 
The papers discussed suggest that scale can confer economic benefits.  But the degree of benefits 
can vary across the type of expansion.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1999) find that the economic 
benefits of consolidation are strongest for those banks engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular, 
interstate expansion that diversifies banks’ macroeconomic risk.  Hughes, Lang, Mester Moon, and 
Pagano (2003) find evidence that an increase in assets by internal growth (in contrast to acquisition) is 
associated with better performance at most banks, consistent with the existence of scale economies.  They 
also find that at banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions (e.g., via merger) and 
asset sales are associated with improved performance, but at banks with entrenched managers, asset sales 
are associated with smaller improvements, and asset acquisitions are associated with worse 
performance.
18  This suggests that while there are value-enhancing incentives to merge, they may be 
subordinated to the incentives to build larger institutions from which entrenched managers can gain 
perquisites.  
5.2 Scope Economies.  Most studies have not found strong evidence of scope economies, either 
between traditional commercial banking products or between on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet 
bank products.  This is not to say that deregulation that permits banks to expand the types of products they 
can offer could not enable banks to take advantage of potential scope economies.  Still, it is difficult to find 
evidence of strong scope economies in the literature, with a few exceptions.  Mester (1991) found evidence 
                                                      
18 Entrenchment is found to be related to higher levels of managerial ownership, better investment opportunities, 
higher inefficiency, and smaller asset size.  
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of diseconomies of scope for mutual savings and loans using 1982 data on California S&Ls, but Mester 
(1993) using 1991 data on U.S. S&Ls found scope economies between traditional outputs – these results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the removal of interest-rate ceilings in 1986 reduced the ability of 
mutual S&L managers to pursue their own goals.   
Mester (1992) measures outputs based on an information-theoretic approach – loan origination, 
monitoring, selling, and buying.  These outputs involve different levels of credit evaluation and loan 
monitoring.  Loans originated or purchased before the current date t and loans originated at t and held are 
the traditional outputs of a bank.  Loans bought at time t and loans originated at time t and sold are less 
traditional.  She finds diseconomies of scope between the traditional banking services and nontraditional 
services. 
Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993), using data on U.S. banks from 1984-1989, find 
evidence of scope economies based on the profit function.  The profit function measure takes into account 
not only cost gains from joint production but also revenue gains perhaps derived from cross-selling.  They 
test whether the optimal quantity of every output is positive for all the price vectors observed in the data 
and find that for most firms, this is true.  This contrasts with Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley (1996), who 
estimated a revenue function using 1978-1990 data on U.S. banks and found no evidence of revenue 
scope economies between loans and deposits.   
5.3 X-Efficiency.  Research on cost X-efficiency in banking generally finds large inefficiencies 
on the order of 20 to 25 percent or more of total banking industry costs when the stochastic methods are 
used.
19  That is, achievement of X-efficiency (elimination of X-inefficiency) at the average bank could 
produce about a 20 to 25 percent cost savings, making this an important source of inefficiency in banking.  
Although 20 percent seems quite large, and perhaps too large to sustain in a reasonably competitive 
industry, I note that similar levels of inefficiency are found in studies of manufacturing and other industries.  
The conclusion from the earlier literature that found constant returns to scale but high levels of X-
                                                      
19 When the nonparametric DEA method is used, there is a greater range of findings from 10 percent to 50 percent.  
 
32 
inefficiency was that managerial inefficiencies outweighed the inefficiencies related to scale and scope.  
However, with the latest studies finding significant scale economies, this conclusion need not be the case.   
Berger and Mester (1997) estimate both cost X-efficiencies and profit X-efficiencies.  The mean 
cost efficiency from their preferred model is 0.868 suggesting that about 13.2 percent of cost is wasted on 
average relative to a best-practice firm.  The mean profit efficiency is much lower, suggesting that 50 
percent of potential profits that could be earned by a best-practice bank are lost to inefficiency.  They also 
find that there is considerably more variation in profit inefficiency among the banks than in cost 
inefficiency, with many banks achieving higher or lower profit efficiency than the average.  As with scale 
economies measurement, how financial capital is modeled affects estimates of X-efficiency.  They find that 
profit X-efficiency was much lower when equity capital was excluded in the profit function.  Instead of 
50 percent inefficiency, the estimates indicate 90 percent inefficiency. 
Berger and Mester (1997) also investigate the relationship between their X-efficiency estimates and 
various aspects of the banks, their markets, and their regulation that are potential correlates of efficiency that 
are at least partially exogenous.  The characteristics investigated fall into six categories: bank size, 
organizational form and corporate governance, other bank characteristics, market characteristics, state 
geographic restrictions on competition, and primary federal regulator.  Both multiple regression and single 
variable regressions were estimated.  A few robust relationships were uncovered.  Large and small banks 
appear to be equally cost X-efficient but large banks are less profit X-efficiency suggesting it is harder to 
efficiently generate revenues as a bank grows in size.  Higher risk, as measured by the standard deviation of 
return on assets, is associated with lower X-efficiency.  Greater market power is associated with lower cost 
X-efficiency and greater profit X-efficiency.  But the basic conclusion from this analysis was that the 
correlates of efficiency are still largely unknown: 25 explanatory variables explain only about 7 percent of 
the variance of measured cost efficiency and 35 percent of the variables of measured profit efficiency.  
Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and Pagano (2002) measure market-value inefficiency by the 
bank’s shortfall ratio, which gives the shortfall of a bank’s market value from its highest potential market 
value as a proportion of the bank’s book-value investment in its assets, net of goodwill.  The measure is  
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derived by stochastic frontier techniques to fit the frontier of market value on book value (i.e., 
replacement cost) of assets.  They find an average shortfall of 19 percent. 
Koetter (2004) studies the efficiency of German banks over the period 1995-2001 using the 
managerial utility-maximization model of Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000).  He finds average 
inefficiency measured relative to the risk-return frontier to be quite low, around 5 percent. 
5.4 Productivity.  There are fewer studies of productivity in banking.  Using data on banks from 
the late 1970s and 1980s, most studies find negative cost productivity growth, on the order of −1 percent 
per year.  Using panel data on 661 top-tier bank holding companies continuously in existence during 
1991-1997, Stiroh (2000) found small cost productivity improvements of between 0.05 percent and 0.47 
percent annually depending on the definitions of output and method of measurement.  But the literature 
suggests that bank size matters.  Some studies find increased productivity growth (in terms of costs or 
profits) in the early 1980s for large banks (due to shifts in the best-practice frontier) but not for small 
banks.  For example, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) found that profits of larger banks in the sample (with 
assets over $500 million) increased by 12 percent between the 1977-1981 period and the 1981-1984 
period.  Decomposing this change, they found that it results form a shift in the profit function and changes 
in business condition, particularly deposit deregulation.  Only business conditions accounted for the risk 
in large banks’ profits form 1981-1984 to 1985-1998.  For smaller banks (assets of $100 million to $500 
million), there was little increase in profits between 1977-1981 and 1971-1984.  Wheelock and Wilson 
(1999) used linear programming techniques (DEA) and decomposed the change in productivity into the 
change in efficiency and the shift in efficient frontier.  They found that banks on the frontier improved 
over the period 1984-1993 but productivity declined, on average, during this period because of reductions 
in efficiency.  Smaller banks (assets below $300 million), in particular, were unable to adapt to changes in 
technology, regulation, and competitive condition and fell further away form the efficient frontier.
20  
Berger and Mester (2003) look at both cost and profit productivity, where productivity is 
measured as a combination of technological change and changes in inefficiency, holding constant the  
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exogenous environmental variables.  They find that during 1991-1997, cost productivity in the banking 
industry worsened while profit productivity improved substantially and concluded this was because 
revenue-based productivity changes are not accounted for in measuring cost productivity.  Banks have 
been offering wider varieties of financial services and have been providing additional convenience, which 
may have raised costs but also raised revenues by more than the cost increases.  They also found that 
banks involved in merger activity might be responsible for their main findings.  The merging banks had 
greater cost productivity deterioration and profit productivity improvements than other banks.  Merging 
banks may have also improved their profit performance, on average, by shifting their portfolios into 
investments with higher risk and higher expected return to take advantage of the diversification gains 
from mergers, as suggested by the work of Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) and Hughes, Mester, 
and Moon (2001). 
6. Conclusions 
  One goal of the research agenda on optimal bank productive efficiency is to answer some 
fundamental questions about financial industry restructuring.  The results from this literature shed light on 
the consolidation trend in the commercial banking industry and suggest some answers to the three 
conundrums posed in the introduction.   
  Conundrum 1: In contrast to the earlier literature, new bank production models that incorporate 
banks’ choice of risk and financial capital and that explicitly consider how banks’ production decisions 
influence their riskiness have uncovered scale economies at very large banks.  This is consistent with the 
consolidation trend, which is creating very large banks and helps resolve the inconsistency between the 
earlier literature’s finding of constant returns to scale and the reality of consolidation.   Diversification 
benefits appear to be a source of these scale economies.  The cost of risk-taking decreases with size.  If 
banks respond to the reduced price by taking on more risk, then the standard models would not be able to 
uncover scale economies. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
20 Berger and Mester (2003) discuss several other studies of bank productivity.  
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  Conundrum 2: There is little evidence of scope economies in the literature, which may explain 
why banks have not responded to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s relaxation of the barriers to offering 
nontraditional activities along with traditional commercial bank activities.  This can only be a tentative 
conclusion, however, since the literature on this topic is thin.  Partly this reflects a lack of data on 
institutions that are mixing these products, since the restrictions on product mix have only recently been 
repealed.  
Conundrum 3: It is true that banks experienced a worsening of cost productivity in the 1990s.  
This might seem at odds with the technological changes that have occurred in banking.  But a focus on 
cost productivity is misleading.  At the same time cost productivity worsened, banks experienced an 
increase in profit productivity.  This is consistent with banks’ offering wider varieties of financial services 
and additional convenience, which may have raised costs but raised revenues more.  Merging banks had 
greater cost productivity deterioration and profit productivity improvements than other banks.  Their 
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